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I owa’s heritage of agrarian Republican­ism underwent a surprisingly colorful, though brief, transformation during the 
late 1960s. The charismatic Harold Hughes 
and a host of other political figures led Iowa 
politics on an ideological merry-go-round that 
centered on the Vietnam War.
In June 1965 Representative John Schmid- 
hauser, a freshman Democrat, heralded the 
first sign of Iowa disenchantment with Presi­
dent Lyndon Johnson’s Vietnam policies. He 
joined twenty-seven other congressmen in 
signing a petition that called for public hearings 
on American involvement in Vietnam.
Opposition to the Vietnam War became a 
campaign issue in the 1966 congressional elec­
tions when E.B. Smith, the Democratic sena­
torial candidate, faced GOP incumbent Jack 
Miller. Smith, who had previously served in 
the U.S. State Department, was a history pro­
fessor at Iowa State University. Although he 
did not carry out a full-scale attack on admin­
istration policy, Smith made an appeal to anti­
war voters to oppose increased aerial bombing 
of North Vietnam. He argued that his position 
on \ ietnam was “not too far from that of Iowa 
independent peace candidate Robert Day. 
Iowa voters were also exposed to national anti­
war politics when Senator Robert Kennedy 
campaigned for the state Democratic ticket, 
criticizing Johnson’s escalation of the war. The 
huge crowds that greeted Kennedy throughout 
the state responded favorably to his speeches, 
though it is uncertain whether they shared his 
anti-war views.
Nevertheless, Vietnam did not emerge as 
the significant issue of the 1966 elections. 
Smith s campaign stressed Senator Miller’s 
votes against Medicare, feed grain programs, 
and minimum wage legislation. Smith s foreign 
policy statements were not forceful enough to 
draw substantial supporters away from Robert 
Day s campaign. Day, in fact, denounced 
Smith s attempts to capitalize on Day’s own 
anti-war stance. Smith was overwhelmed by
Miller in the general election, and in the same 
election year Representative Schmidhauser — 
who had been praised by his Iowa constituents 
for his opposition to the activities of the House 
Un-American Activities Committee during his 
first term in office — was also defeated.
By 1967, however, national anti-war senti­
ment rose as President Johnson’s war efforts 
met with increasing disapproval. Governor 
Hughes, who had previously been a supporter 
of administration policies, boldly declared his 
opposition to the war. The conjunction of 
Hughes’ anti-war posture with the political ex­
citement generated by the presidential candi­
dacies of Senators Eugene McCarthy and 
Robert Kennedy catapulted Vietnam out of the 
sphere of campus demonstrations. The war be­
came an issue hotly debated by Iowa poli­
ticians.
Governor Hughes, a well-known friend and ally of Kennedy, stunned the state on August 22, 1968, when he endorsed 
McCarthy for president. He cited Vietnam as 
the primary reason for his decision. “It is now 
clear,” he said, “that we do not have the re­
sources to provide guns and butter — or even 
guns and margarine — in terms of our domestic 
needs. V ietnam is not the only issue, but it is 
the key issue. Hughes’ endorsement of 
McCarthy was quickly echoed by a number of 
other prominent Democrats, including Lieu­
tenant Governor Robert Fulton and former 
Representative Schmidhauser.
Those who argue that Hughes made this 
move for reasons of political expediency ignore 
the results of the Des Moines Register polls 
taken during this period. One poll indicated 
that Richard Nixon would defeat McCarthy for 
the presidency by a 50 to 34 percent margin in 
Iowa. The same poll also revealed that Iowa 
voters, on the question of who “could best 
handle the war,” preferred Nixon to McCarthy
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by a margin of 49 percent to 26 percent. Other 
Iowa newspapers adopted a more intrusive ap­
proach in commenting on Hughes’ decision. 
The Waterloo Courier accused Hughes of mov­
ing “to the far left of American politics” for his 
endorsement of McCarthy. Such attacks did 
not intimidate Hughes, who chose to deliver 
the nominating speech for McCarthy at the 
tumultuous Democratic National Convention 
in Chicago.
T he Iowa electorate seemed fragmented by Hughes’ anti-war stance. An Iowa poll revealed that 29 percent of the elec­
torate believed that Hughes’ endorsement of 
McCarthy hurt his Senate candidacy, 20 per­
cent believed it helped, 31 percent said it made 
no difference, and 20 percent had no opinion.
Following a massive primary victory over 
token opposition, Governor Hughes was con­
fronted with the political struggle of his career 
in his 1968 Senate race. His opponent, David 
Stanley, a forty-year-old state senator from 
Muscatine, was reputedly a moderate Republi­
can. During the campaign, however, Stanley’s 
statements on Vietnam foreshadowed the poli­
cy statements of Richard Nixon during the 
“Vietnamization period. Declaring that “we 
must build peace through strength,” Stanley 
attacked Hughes’ call for an unconditional 
bombing halt. Stanley’s campaign utilized 
much of the traditional rhetoric employed by 
anti-Communist partisans of the 1950s. For 
example, one campaign ad featured Stanley 
gazing at the Berlin Wall. The caption quoted 
Stanley’s assertion that “this ugly Wall is Com­
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munist tyranny’s attempt to block human 
freedom.
Stanley also tried to encourage voter back­
lash against anti-war activity. He attacked 
Governor Hughes policies of leniency towards 
college disturbances in Iowa City in 1967.
Forty highway patrolmen who were sitting in 
a bus watching that riot wanted to help, but 
couldn’t, because of an order from Des Moines
to stay put. When these remarks are viewed in 
the context of his attacks on the Great Societv 
social welfare policies, Stanley’s conservative 
“law and order stance becomes clearer.
Stanley’s rhetoric did not cause Governor 
Hughes to moderate his criticism of the war. 
Hughes’ campaign may be seen as a classic 
example of a politician who sought to educate 
rather than inflame voters. Hughes responded 
to Stanley’s strident rhetoric with a serene op­
timism:
We can find the strength to overcome 
these forces that threaten our way of life. 
But military might alone will not assure 
peace among nations. . . . We must also 
unite our people and hind the wounds of 
our society. As the most powerful nation 
on earth, America can afford to take the 
initiative for peace, and we have a moral 
obligation to take that initiative.
Hughes’ campaign speeches presented audi­
ences with graphic descriptions of nuclear, 
germ, and gas warfare in a determined attempt 
to dramatize the danger of militarism. In re­
sponse to Stanley’s criticism of his call for a 
bombing halt, Hughes simply asked, Do we 
want to end war by making more warP
I n November Hughes defeated Stanley by 6,000 votes. Nixon’s landslide in Iowa and Stanley’s heavily financed campaign 
blunted Hughes’ reputation as one of the most 
powerful vote-getters in Iowa history. I he final 
results indicated a rather dramatic urban-rural 
split in the state, with Des Moines and Cedar
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Governor Harold Hughes (SHSI)
Rapids as major Hughes strongholds.
W hat impact did Vietnam have on the elec­
tionJ Hughes educational campaign suc­
ceeded to a certain extent: one month before 
the election a Register poll revealed that 
Hughes was thought to be best equipped to 
handle the war by a 43 to 32 percent margin 
over Stanley, with 25 percent undecided. On 
the other hand, the depth of strong anti-war 
sentiment reflected in the poll is questionable, 
since the same poll showed the voters’ strong 
faith in Nixon s ability to find a solution to
\ ietnam. Hughes’ great advantage was his 
enormous personal stature: when asked which 
candidate would make the best impression for 
the State of Iowa” in the national spotlight, 
Hughes was chosen over Stanley by a margin of 
36 to 30 percent, with 14 percent undecided. 
Clearly, the force of Hughes’ personality man­
aged to draw voters who were either ambiva­
lent about or even supportive of the war. Vot­
ing tor Hughes, however, did not prevent 
Iowans from voting against other anti-war can­
didates; John Schmidhauser was defeated in 
his 1968 comeback campaign in the First Dis­
trict, and the Republican state senator Tom 
Riley, who ran on an anti-war platform against 
Representative John Culver, was also defeated 
in the Second District race.
V estiges of the late 1960s anti-war senti­ment resurfaced in Iowa politics in the election campaigns of the early 1970s. 
George McGovern made a relatively impres­
sive showing in 1972, and liberal Democrats 
John Culver and Dick Clark won their respec­
tive races for the U. S. Senate in 1972 and 1974.
Eventually, the Nixon administration re­
sponded to the growing national consensus that 
the Vietnam conflict should be terminated. 
Unfortunately perhaps, gradual withdrawal of 
troops and the ambiguous implementation of 
Nixon’s “peace with honor plan foreclosed the 
continuing heated ideological debates that had 
stamped Iowa politics in the decade of the 
1960s. □
